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ABSTRACT
Given unwieldy cross-border electoral spillovers, how feasible is North Amer-
ican political integration? Even by largely satisfying neofunctionalist and security
community theoretical tenets, this study finds North American political integra-
tion ultimately depends on: (a) a bipartisan orientation shift; (b) institutionalizing
this shift; (c) the relative weight of integrative and disintegrative instincts;
(d) safeguards against external shocks; (e) creating new opportunities of cooper-
ation; and (f ) leadership compatibility. Among other findings: (a) U.S. elections
impact Canada and Mexico more than vice versa; (b) insufficient Canadian-Mex-
ican economic flows deepen asymmetry towards the United States; (c) both ideol-
ogy and pragmatic leadership fuel North Americanization; and (d) post-Cold War
issues actually increase Mexico’s Washington influence at Canada’s expense. By
favoring interdependence over integration, asymmetry ultimately becomes the
straw that will break the North American camel’s back.
Key words: North Americanization; functionalism/neofunctionalism; security community; re-
gional political/economic integration; socioeconomic electoral criteria; electoral externalities;
multiculturalism; evangelism.
QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH
Is electing the chief executive in Canada, Mexico, or the United States impacting the
North American region? After 12 years of the North American Free Trade Agreement
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(NAFTA), can political integration build upon economic integration? Does North
Americanization reflect integration, interdependence, or simply convergence? How
do all of the above relate to embedded North American asymmetry?
Four sections in this article address these questions. Beginning with a theoret-
ical discussion of comparative concepts and analytical dimension, I apply these to
an examination of electing chief executives, singling out the 2004 U.S. election for
extra attention. Drawing conclusions and projecting future implications complete
the study.
THEORETICAL MERRY-GO-ROUND
Two theoretical contexts prove useful: political development, which provides com-
parative electoral components, and the economic and political integration inter-
relationship, which seeks lessons from West European experiences.
Comparative Electoral Components
Elections are all about politics; and at least within the domestic context, politics are
all about elections: which party wins, what policies to adopt, how to distribute
rewards and costs, and who to hold responsible from the essential considerations in
both politics and elections. Both beasts change slightly when examined across coun-
tries. Gabriel Almond’s “political culture” provided the original comparative yard-
stick (1957: 396), but was subsequently disaggregated, modified, or refined, either
as policy catalysts or responses, into other types of culture, related processes and
institutions, unavoidable crises and sequences, and issue orientations.
From a study of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations, Almond and
Sidney Verba decomposed civic culture into parochial, subject, and participant
types (1963: ch. 1), to which Lucian Pye added rationalization at a level beyond the
state (1965: ch. 1). Salient among their end products was an upwardly mobile coun-
try-specific group, and how this group rallies across national boundaries is becoming
a standard topic of investigation. Leonard Binder and others in the Social Science
Research Council (SSRC) alerted us to crises and sequences in what they called the de-
velopment syndrome. Distinguishing between differentiation, equality, and capacity in
the evolving political system, they exposed identity, legitimacy, participation, penetra-
tion, and distribution as comparable categories, and thereby the crisis potential of each
and a possible sequence among them (Binder, Coleman, La Palombara et al., 1971).
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All was not as well and good as theory predicted. At least three weaknesses were
retrospectively discerned. First, specific policies were neglected, and dramatically ex-
posed by the 1970s oil price hikes. Second, adopting an etic approach at the expense of
the emic virtually ignored idiosyncrasies in favor of epistemic interpretations (Avruch,
1998: 60-72), thus breeding the inappropriate one-size-fits-all analytical tendency. Fi-
nally, viewing countries as being either developed or not on the analytical drawing
board produced an undesirable Manichean twist whereby shades of gray, that is, dif-
ferent developmental experiences, could not be meaningfully explained.
Specifying policy issues produced mixed results. Since each issue is assigned a
different priority by different countries, any selection automatically carried an in-
herent bias, yet, the more dynamics captured by the analytical frameworks, the more
robust the analysis and interpretations. The need to step beyond the state increased
as the number of issues vying for attention increased. Accommodating similar and
different country responses to positions on the state of the economy, immigration, the
environment, and other policy areas inspired innovative interpretations (Ashford, 1981;
1982; Conradt, 1986; Graham and  Farkas et al., 1994; Heclo and  Madsen, 1987;
Katzenstein, 1987; Safran, 1991), and expanded our knowledge of presidential-par-
liamentary governments, pluralist-corporatist influences, and ideological-pragmat-
ic orientations.
Exogeneity and endogeneity became relevant terms (Lane and Errson, 2003:
12-13), the former alluding to externalizing domestic policy preferences, and the
latter to internalizing policy preferences from other countries. The economy, eth-
nicity, religion, political institutions, democratic consolidation, and other spillovers
exemplify of both. Immanuel Kant’s three definitive articles on liberalism were
revived when the Cold War ended, informing us on the emergence of constitution-
al law, whether it was translating into international law, and what the prospects of
cosmopolitan law were (Doyle, 1986: 1150-69). Because liberalism is interpreted dif-
ferently depending, for instance, on how much one benefits from it, we find out
why exploitation is a popular less-developed-country (LDC) interpretation, while an
escalator of progress provides the corresponding developed country (DC) metaphor.
Mexico’s North American positioning illustrates many of these points. Its shift
from what Peruvian poet Mario Vargas Llosa called the “perfect dictatorship” in the
early 1990s to what Freedom House labeled a “free” country in 2004 (Puddington
and Piano, 2005: 103-08), ended the sexenio cycle (Edwards and Naím, 1997):
between 1976 and 1994, mismanagement, misappropriations, and myopic policy-
making, produced economic crisis by the last year of every president’s 6-year term;
yet large-scale borrowings from Washington catalyzed liberalization and democra-
tization. President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León’s breaking the dedazo tradition of
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not appointing his successor in 2000 led to his party, the PRI, being defeated for the
first time in 70 years, but filled the missing democratization blank of governmental
rotation and produced a free trade agreement with the European Union, which pre-
conditions it on democratic performance. On the other hand, Devesh Kapur and
Moisés Naím express concern that the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) “widen-
ing agenda” in “achieving capitalist ‘development’” only breeds “grave pause to any-
one who cares about the plight of democracy in borrower countries” (2005: 89-99).
Various dimensions of ideology also begged attention. Because ideology was
“present in many democratic party systems,” Arend Lijphart spelled out seven
comparative dimensions (1981: 26-27): socioeconomic, religious, cultural-ethnic,
urban-rural, regime support, foreign policy, and post-materialism. Table 1 extracts
his observations for Canada and U.S. in the first seven rows, while parenthesizing
twenty-first century adjustments for both and adding Mexico. The last row speci-
fies various traits of candidate selection in the three countries.
In the first row, the socioeconomic dimension addresses at least four issues: (a)
public versus private ownership; (b) governmental intervention or restraint in the
economy; (c) wealth distribution; and (d) social welfare provisions by the government.
Although Lijphart found left-right ideological differences to be moderate in Canada
and the United States during the 1970s, compared to West European countries, the
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Table 1
IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS AND CANDIDATE SELECTION: 
NORTH AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS AND CHIEF EXECUTIVES
Dimensions Canada Mexico United States
Socioeconomic x x x
Religious x (x)
Cultural-ethnic x (x)
Urban-rural x (x)
Regime support 
Foreign policy x (x)
Post-materialism (x)
Traits Incumbency, Above average Incumbency, above
above-average socioeconomic status average socioecon-
socioeconomic status and education; omic status and
and education, local Mexico City education; local
connections but connections but connections 
state-wide appeal state-wide appeal but state-wide appeal 
Sources: Lijphart, 1981: 31; Ranney, 1981: 75-106.
socioeconomic dimension still stood out as the most significant of them all. In the
absence of an ideological flavor, unbridled post-Cold War liberalization may also
widen those differences between both countries. Mexico’s socioeconomic impetus,
which also lacks this ideological bent, is nevertheless stronger because it constantly con-
fronts pressures from embedded economic polarization, social stratification, and
continued political patronage. The absence of ideological influence does not mean the
end of ideology, but its conversion into a political instrument utilized subjectively.
Lijphart did not find religion important in either Canada or the United States
in the 1970s, but evangelism is emerging as a dominant U.S. political force today.
Since it is premised upon converting non-believers, especially in other countries, it
is becoming a potentially formidable foreign policy instrument directed at indige-
nous populations, as in Mexico’s South. Even though Mexico’s Catholicism also
benefited from the president’s PAN party being more closely connected with the
church than the PRI ever was, the soft, subtle evangelical challenge it faces today
could become destabilizing and serve as a preview of Latin America (Samuel Shah,
2004: 117-31).
Related to the religion dimension is the cultural-ethnic counterpart, a cleavage
Lipset and Stein Rokkan brought to the analytical forefront to account for the
homogeneous-heterogeneous country dichotomy (1964: 1-64). As the world’s first
institutionally multi-culturalized country, and with the Anglo-Saxon versus French
divide being older than the country itself, Canada alone reflected this dimension in
the 1970s. While it continues to do so even today, albeit on a diminishing post-NAFTA
note, the United States, at least from Samuel P. Huntington’s viewpoint, is exhibit-
ing a dramatic transformation along these lines with Hispanics not only displacing
Afro-Americans as the largest minority since 2003 but also challenging the Anglo-
Saxon U.S. core, much to Huntington’s dismay (2004: 30-45). Electoral patterns can-
not escape these socioeconomic dynamics. The U.S. Hispanic vote, for example, still
remains largely Democrat, but the increasing shift toward the Republican Party
may deprive Democrats from precisely the critical votes they need to prevail in
close elections (Chávez-Márquez, 2005: 98). This is new, and if it makes Hispanics
a critical U.S. voting bloc, the huge North American consequences cannot be
ignored. Similarly for Mexico, just as economic liberalization provoked the 13 per-
cent of its inhabitants known as indigenous by privatizing ejidos, democratic elec-
tions are likely to become more unpredictable and divisive because of this and
other similar emergent cleavages.
Another Lipset-Rokkan cleavage, certainly for Mexico, but not insignificant for
the U.S. as the 2004 presidential elections indicated, is urban-rural. Although not a
factor, Lijphart found relevant during the 1970s in either Canada or the United
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States, it may be of ascending twenty-first century importance in both Mexico and
the U.S. This cleavage overlaps the cultural-ethnic cleavage discussed earlier,
accentuated also by NAFTA-triggered farm liberalization sowing seeds of discord
across the countryside. How this plays out in Mexico’s 2006 elections may better
explain its long-term strength, especially when NAFTA is widening the north-south
gap within Mexico. That it is not a passive force was evident in the 2004 U.S. elec-
tions: Republicans triumphed in critical Ohio, for instance, by mobilizing the con-
servative countryside with both an evangelical message and appeals to trust and
character, replicated elsewhere across middle America by Karl Rove, Bush’s multi-
purpose brain (Green, 2004: 96; and Tumulty, 2004-2005: 47).
Regime support measures the degree of opposition to existing democratic
regimes, typically triggered from the far-left or far-right flanks of the political spec-
trum. It was not a factor in the 1970s, and remains unimportant in Canada and the
United States even today. Nevertheless, how the 2000 U.S. elections produced a
president who did not have the popular majority vote and why the 2004 elections
show signs of another realignment suggest increasing erosion of regime support
(Schafer, 1991: 63-64). Even within the dominant Republican Party, disdain for
Washington politics based on interest-group influences may be producing a quite
different democratic beast. Government intervention becomes a subsequently mal-
leable issue to also spill over into the regime-support category, as with other issues
invoking inter-branch U.S. politics. Whether the president is imperial (Neustadt,
1960), the judiciary neutral, or Congress representative are as debatable today in the
United States as during the country’s foundation between 1776 and 1789 in
Philadelphia.
Though not yet a salient force in Mexico, paralysis from a divided government
may invite the kind of populism common in Latin American history, and with it,
democratic erosion of sorts. Besides, Mexico’s transition from the PRI’s perfect dicta-
torship is far from complete, suggesting the hiatus still remaining between adopting
and institutionalizing certain norms, on the one hand, and their full-fledged transla-
tion into real life, on the other. A previous reference to economic polarization, social
stratification, and political patronage suggests it will be a long and thorny road.
Although foreign policy did not exert barometric socioeconomic pressures
during the 1970s, it may emerge as a salient post-9/11 factor in the United States
and become an increasing post-NAFTA Mexican consideration (Wolfe, 2004: 97-118).
Certainly the war on terrorism gave the incumbent an edge during the 2004 elec-
tions, a factor Republicans have capitalized on as effectively as the Democrats have
not, and whose future consequences for U.S. politics could be immense. Greater
Mexican trade dependence on the United States also makes foreign policy increas-
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ingly significant to its elections. How much more to liberalize and which public sec-
tor industry to deregulate next remain paramount Mexican concerns. Even the emi-
gration of Mexican maquiladoras indicates how global production is challenging
North American production at Mexico’s expense. Compounding all of these are the
diversions of U.S. foreign policy interests from economic to security issues after
9/11, and the simultaneous U.S. priority shift from NAFTA to the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) and other free trade agreements (FTAs). Ironically, 9/11, NAFTA,
and the FTAA also expose how Canada’s uncomfortable coexistence with the U.S.
makes foreign policy salient. Otherwise Ross Perot’s infamous prediction of jobs
being swallowed by a giant sucking sound in the south, also becomes true for Can-
ada and the U.S.
Finally, post-materialism, evident in such policy areas as environmental pro-
tection, human rights considerations, and simple quality of life issues, is increasing-
ly reflecting Canadian leadership. At the same time, given its antithetical relationship
with unrestricted liberalism and materialism, it remains a poor Mexican and U.S.
predictor. Ronald Inglehart coined the term to capture grassroots concerns (for
example, greater policy-making participation by citizens [1977]), and although NAFTA’s
side-bar agreements boosted local-level engagements in all three countries, post-
material values have so far been subordinated to materialist pursuits, particularly
in Mexico and the United States.
Polarizing these dichotomies is ideology, perhaps the bedrock interpretational
prism of democracy as expressed by a political party. In his study of “the values,
beliefs, and issue-positions” of U.S. parties between the 1830s and 1990s, John
Gerring finds party views not only “coherent, differentiated, and stable,” but also
“irreducibly ideological” (1998: 6). By lumping Whigs and Republicans into one
category, he finds a historical ideological shift inside the party from nationalism
between 1828 and 1924 toward neoliberalism from 1928. Likewise, Democrats shift-
ed from Jeffersonianism during 1828 to 1892 to populism between 1896 and 1948,
before embracing universalism thereafter. Whereas Republican attention shifted
from the order-anarchy dichotomy to the state-individual counterpart, Democrats
prioritized liberty-tyranny, people-interest groups, and inclusion-exclusion, in that
order, during the three phases examined. Accordingly, and interestingly, the origi-
nal Republican themes of Protestantism, moral reforms, mercantilism, free labor,
social harmony, and statism were replaced by anti-statism, free market capitalism,
right-wing populism, and individualism. With George W. Bush’s evangelism
(Guth, 2004: ch. 6), a twenty-first century Republican admixture may be emerging.
On the other hand, Democrats remain today at the other end of wherever they were
originally, when white supremacy, anti-statism, and civic Republicanism domi-
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nated. Replaced by egalitarianism, majoritarianism, and Christian humanism, their
key characteristics became civil rights, social welfare, redistribution, and inclusion
(Gerring, 1998: tables 1 and 2).
Canada’s parties evolved similarly. In their collective work, André Blais, Henry
Brady, Jean Crête, and Richard Johnston find three Lipset-Rokkan dichotomies rel-
evant to explaining party-based cleavages between 1878 and 1984. The period was
dominated by Liberals, though under three different political systems, with each
transition highlighting a short-lived Conservative landslide: in 1912, 1957, and
1984. Cleavages reflected ethnicity-religion, metropolitan living or countryside,
and class-consciousness triggered by labor preferences (1992: 588-91).
When the secret vote was first introduced in 1878, Canada’s Conservatives
took charge politically and were to remain behind the steering wheel until 1896,
when Canada’s “Liberal Century” began. Ironically, the ethno-religious cleavage also
remained salient throughout that century, aligning with the Anglo-Saxon-French
divide. While the Conservatives found natural support from Anglos and, interest-
ingly, Quebecois francophones until 1896, Liberals increasingly attracted French
support. Even as the Conservatives remained popular in the countryside, they did
not quite connect philosophically with western farmers. Similarly, the Liberals
could not abandon their urban roots and appeal to swing countryside voters suffi-
ciently. Not surprisingly, Sir John A. Macdonald’s staunchly nationalistic policy ori-
entation in the late nineteenth century was not embraced by farmers, and not until
John Diefenbaker began embracing free trade after 1957 would the farmers flock
to the Conservatives. Ironically, it was the Conservative proposal for free trade with
the United States in 1985 that stuck, not the ill-fated 1911 Liberal proposal (Hillmer
and Granatstein, 1994: 35-45). Nevertheless, not heeding the 1911 lesson of avoiding
free trade agreements with the United States would come back to haunt Brian Mul-
roney, who made the 1985 proposal. In the 1988 election, he not only saw his huge
margin of victory reduced to palpitating levels (Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête,
1991: 315-339), but was in fact forced to resign shortly thereafter because free trade
with the United States had become so unpopular. Canada and Mexico must cali-
brate foreign policy and domestic preferences shrewdly.
Mexico’s PRI probably proved to be the most coherent and stable, but undiffer-
entiated, North American party by virtue of its long tenure at the helm. Although
Mexico’s leftist party, the PRD, is more radical than Canada’s Liberals and the U.S.
Democrats, it is seeking a more pragmatic policy positioning than in the past, espe-
cially under Mexico City Mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador. His philosophical
admixtures echo those of Democrat Bill Clinton in the United States and Liberal
Paul Martin in Canada. On the other side of the spectrum, the PAN is the flag-bearer
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of moral issues in Mexico, aligns more with the Catholic church than any other
major party, and appears as the ideological counterpart of the Canadian Conserva-
tives and U.S. Republicans. If North America is to ever show the central tendencies
within the European Parliament, where the Christian Democrats and the Social
Democrats serve as the ideological flanks (Raunio, 2001: 231-51), these political
alignments may represent more a reality than wishful thinking. How these ideolog-
ical identities adjust to the pragmatism of regionalist policy-making is a fascinating
topic of investigation whose time is beckoning: already in the NAFTA-triggered inte-
grative atmosphere, legislators from all three countries not only convene frequently
but also issue joint statements on selected issues, a genesis not  very different from
the embryonic stages of the European Parliament during the 1960s and 1970s (Judge
and Earnshaw, 2002).
Drawing North American identities and parallels such as these is still precari-
ous. For example, although Canadian Liberals get along comfortably with U.S.
Democrats, particularly when Chrétien and Clinton led their respective countries,
strain is not unknown: Jimmy Carter and Trudeau, for example, had a rather cool
relationship. Similarly, although the PAN’s Fox and Republican George W. Bush got
their rancho politics off famously, highlighted by the 2001 White House celebration
of Mexico’s Cinco de Mayo eviction of the French in the 1860s, PRI presidents like
Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Zedillo were also popular in Washington, the former
even nominated by the United States as the first director general of the World Trade
Organization in 1994. Whether Conservatives-Republicans-PAN become North Amer-
ica’s Christian Democrats, as in the European Parliament, or Liberals-Democrats-PRI/
PRD become Europe’s Social Democrats across North America or not, a regional-level
ideological identity faces several constraints.
One is regional asymmetry favoring the U.S. This has the effect of compelling
parties of different ideological feathers in Canada and Mexico to pay heed and, no
matter how imperfectly or half-heartedly, to adjust to their powerful neighbor’s
preferences. A second reason may be Mexico’s less-developed stature: since it is not
quite in the same ranks as Canada and the United States, post-industrial issues have
commanded, and are likely to continue commanding, only token attention, while
the wide North American economic gap is likely to sustain a healthy anti-capitalist
resistance as in the past, thus encouraging leftist parties and identities to tilt left
even more than in Canada or the U.S. Finally, amidst Canadian divisions, economic
imperatives to stay connected to the U.S. engine, and multilateral instincts extend-
ing regionalism beyond the U.S., are likely to be both uphill and peculiar. While the
original division between Anglo-Saxons and French seems to be ebbing at the turn
of the new century, NAFTA may actually be marginalizing Quebec more than one
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may have expected, as the flight of businesses from the province suggests; and at
the same time a new east-west division gaining momentum seems to be transcend-
ing not only the Anglo-Saxon versus French schism, but  also attracting second gen-
eration Asian immigrants significantly to actually give the Liberalist-Conservative
divide a new face. How liberal status-preserving Chinese or Indians may become
remains as open a question as  what degree of moral considerations may fragment
Conservatives. 
Economically, as the 1985 MacDonald Report recommended, Canada has no
choice but to strengthen relations with the U.S., its largest partner, if it is to remain
viable, yet U.S. trade-boosting efforts in other parts of the world only subtract from
Canada: with diversified partners, the U.S. needs Canada less than vice versa. Even
Canadian multiculturalism is a source of the post-9/11 U.S. threat: northern U.S.
borders face greater surveillance than ever before. Finally, Canadian multilateral-
ism also undermines the country’s regional prospects. They represent, according to
Tom Keating, “an article of faith in the practice of Canadian foreign policy for
decades,” and “one of the most defining characteristics of Canadian foreign policy”
(1993: 9-10). Increasingly, though, they have been diverging from U.S. interests, as
evident in the 1990 Canadian proposal for a multilateral trading organization, to
break the GATT Uruguay Round deadlock, which the U.S. summarily rejected
(Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995: 36). Both are WTO members, as is Mexico, but their
attitudes and priorities differ remarkably: Canada pins a lot of hope on the institu-
tion, Mexico’s North American and NAFTA attachments result in no more than lip
service for the WTO, and the U.S. acts largely independently of the WTO, reflecting its
suspicion of an organization it cannot control as it could the GATT.
Behind these convergences and compatibilities as well as divergences and
incompatibilities, leadership may make the difference in bending rules, altering
patterns, and charting new ventures. Austin Ranney’s appraisal of how legislative
electoral candidate selection in various democracies is not irrelevant to chief exec-
utives and sheds light on this study. The last Table 1 row shows significant similar-
ities in the traits most valued among aspirants, and their consistency with the key
dimensions of party ideology discussed previously. His observations of Canada
and the United States are presented with comparable Mexican traits. Clearly the
socioeconomic dimension highlighted previously is common, an overriding fea-
ture, and the springboard of North Americanizing elections, politics, and ideologies. 
Yet, the constraints remain. First, as an uneven playing field, North America
will be as dominated politically by the U.S. as it is economically. Second, as a func-
tion of this asymmetry, persisting countervailing Canadian and Mexican forces at
levels below the chief executive and the federal government, furnishing political
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capital in times of elections, threaten to neutralize any political integration across the re-
gion. Finally, unlike the European case in which a cadre of technocrats provide the
infrastructure for political leaders to latch on to, the inverse North American pattern
finds political leaders supplying the infrastructure upon which technocrats seek posi-
tioning: Canada’s pattern of local politics determining state politics does not create
the scope to build regional-level technocrats; Mexico’s top-heavy and one-term pres-
idential leadership prevents long-term technocracy-led institutionalization; and the
U.S. separation of powers promotes both local politics through the Congress and
international politics through the presidency at the expense of regional politics or
long-term technocratic development. This is not to say technocrats are in short supply,
but sustaining their commitment to a single goal with limited incentives ultimately
prevents a North American regionalized infrastructure from developing on a level
playing field. Since regionalization has generally received greater support from elites
than the masses, the North American experiment is too understaffed and undernour-
ished to handle integration over sensitive issues. Remarkably, emerging epistemic
communities across academia emphasize bilateral or trilateral studies, workshops,
programs, college-level courses, and a variety of publications. Not all predate NAFTA,
yet their staggering volume and growth-rate are demand greater policy-making
attention.
Relating Economic and Political Integration
North American economic integration differed from other cases and is too dis-
connected with politically integrative efforts. Yet, neither pursuit was stillborn:
although a variety of convergences and compatibilities reflect more interdepen-
dence than regional integration (Nau, 1979: 119-47), if preferences and circumstances
improve in the near future, the infrastructure to shift from interdependence to in-
tegration is available. Borrowing from Henry Nau’s work, and modifying the
pathfinding treatment of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1977: 3-37). Table 2
distinguishes between interdependence and integration. 
Contemporary North American experiments may not be far different from
West European experiences of the 1950s: just as significant external developments,
like the 1971 breakdown of Bretton Woods and the oil price-hikes after 1973 altered
the rosy initiation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) during the
1950s, so too may external developments shift North America from interdepen-
dence toward integration, or from regional integration toward hemispheric or glob-
al integration. For example, if China becomes the top U.S. trading partner, Canada
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and Mexico may swallow U.S. asymmetry and seek more meaningful regionalized
arrangements, or if U.S. indebtedness soars or the dollar collapses, regional arrange-
ments to thwart market vulnerabilities may be reinforced. On the other hand, spiraling
Mexican wages may shift U.S. production to Central America or beyond the Western
Hemisphere, just as Canada’s immigrants from China and India might diversify inter-
ests from North America toward Asia. Of course, another 9/11 would drive the nail
of regionalization more forcefully, though not in unpredictable directions.
Integration theories have been known to run in circles, backtrack unpredic-
tably, and even ride the crest of other developments seeking different goals. Gener-
ally traced to David Mitrany’s functionalism during World War II (1948: 350-60),
they quickly reached a dead-end after the war itself ended. Inquiring why, Ernst B.
Haas pointed to the four sins they committed: (a) failure to distinguish background,
concurrent, and a posteriori variables; (b) neglecting nationalism; (c) ignoring the
external environment; and (d ) not recognizing the huge sociopolitical and socioeco-
nomic changes in Europe within which functionalism was being sought (2004:
xiv-xv). His study of the ECSC, from its birth with the 1951 Treaty of Paris to the 1957
Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community (EEC), corrected these
omissions by retaining the state, instead of eliminating it in the process of econom-
ic integration.
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Table 2
INTERDEPENDENCE VERSUS INTEGRATION: INSIGHTS
Dimension Interdependence Integration
Channels of communication Multiple, but security Multiple, but economic
most important most important
Hierarchy of issues? Not necessarily, but Yes, economic definitively
military ever-present at the top
as dominant priority
Subordination of military? Yes, conditionally (in crisis) Yes, unconditionally
Nature of institutional Voluntary and involuntary, Involuntary, emphasizing
membership emphasizing all institutions only central institutions
Catalyst New knowledge Competitive markets
Placement of regionalism Less important to More important than
along levels of globalization and globalization and 
policy-making analysis nationalism nationalism
Source: Adapted from Keohane and Nye, 1997: chapters 1-2; and Nau, 1979: 119-147.
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The neofunctionalist end-goal is political integration. In Haas’s own words,
political integration is “the process whereby political actors in several distinct nation-
al settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities
toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states” (2004: 16). When this happens, a political community is
formed “in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central
political institutions than to any other political authority” (2004: 5). His political com-
munity differs from the simultaneously advocated security community paradigm of
Karl W. Deutsch and others (1957). The key distinction is Haas’s emphasis on insti-
tutions and Deutsch’s disinterest in them: according to Haas, they convert ideology
into laws. Other characteristics were needed to convert national into supranational
orientations (2004: 9-10): (a) interest groups and political parties preferring suprana-
tional actions over those of their own national governments; (b) broadening their
own interests beyond the state according to those actions; (c) an evolving common
ideology connecting them all; (d) generating a common doctrine called supranational-
ism to replace the existing nationalist doctrine; (e) groups and governments accepting
supranational laws even if they conflicted with national laws; and (f) governments
socializing the practice of yielding in impasses, rather than applying vetos.
Facilitating political integration, at least in Western Europe at the time, were a
number of economic policy initiatives or developments. Haas identified five (2004: 12):
(a) eliminating tariffs, quotas, and exchange controls on trade between members; (b) aban-
doning unilateral actions against trade restrictions; (c) joint action redressing prob-
lems stemming from eliminating trade barriers; (d) harmonizing national policies to the
greatest extent possible; and (e) permitting free movement of labor and capital.
The question arises as to which of the two paradigms, security community or neo-
functionalism, better explains North American developments and transformations.
Security Community Paradigm 
In postulating the security community thesis during the 1950s, Deutsch and others
distinguished amalgamated from pluralistic varieties, the former involving the sur-
render of state sovereign rights to a collective body, the latter highlighting com-
monalities without surrendering sovereign rights. While their respective examples
were the United States and the Canada-United States community, Table 3 shows a
hypothetical Mexico-U.S. security community increasingly satisfying three pluralist
conditions in the top three rows, and all but the surrender of sovereign rights char-
acteristic from the amalgamated alternative in the bottom nine rows. 
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Table 3
CONDITIONS OF PLURALISTIC AND AMALGAMATED SECURITY COMMUNITIES: 
MEXICO-UNITED STATES TRANSFORMATIONS
Dimensions
Value compatibility
Behavioral predictability
Mutual responsiveness
Value complementarity
Distinctiveness in lifestyles
Reward expectations before
burden sharing
Increasing political and
administrative functions
Economic growth distin-
guishing core areas from
peripheral areas
Communication linkages
geographically and socially
Multiplying communications
and transactions
Decreasing barriers to 
mobility across political
boundaries 
Increasing political elites
Pre-1980s 
Minimal, contradictory; nation-
alism vs. globalism
Mixture of collaboration and
suspicion undermining pre-
dictability, in turn reflecting
value divergences
Officially low, publicly slightly
higher: different values led to
different policy directions; 
but increasing societal 
interaction bridged the 
gap to some extent
Minimal, contradictory;
nationalism vs. globalism
Very high nationalism
ensures this
Minimal burden sharing to
trigger common rewards
Kept to minimum
Not adequately addressed on
bilateral basis; priorities lay
elsewhere
Limited linkages existed, but
subjected to controls
Not possible given the overall
nationalistic and/or Cold War
orientations
Not really: Braceros promoted
mobility, but subject
to supervision
Evident, but small in numbers
and nationalistic in orientations
Post-1980s
Democratic values, liberalism,
rules of regional integration,
and an emerging binational
constituency
Increasing identities pave way
for higher predictability, 
in turn reflect value 
convergences
Increasing function, 
galvanized further by 
increasing rapport 
between leaders
Democratic values, liberalism,
rules of regional integration,
and binationalism
Erosion of nationalism
reduces distinctiveness
Greater burden sharing
generating future rewards
Explosion of functions, some
symmetrically undertaken
Clearly addressed through
NAFTA and  policy priority:
border growth
Linkages proliferate, often
without controls
Without doubt:
globalization, liberalization,
and democratization
Clearly for trade and
investment, increasingly for
legal human flows
Massively evident, in numbers
and expansive orientation 
Adapted from Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., 1990: 431-459.
With the 1980s serving as a dividing line, we find value complementarity re-
placing value competitiveness, facilitating behavioral predictability and mutual
responsiveness in the process. Before the 1980s, Mexico’s nationalism contrasted
with U.S. internationalism; import substitution diametrically opposed the econom-
ic liberalism of GATT, which the U.S. championed but which Mexico did not even
join for four full decades; when Mexico campaigned for nuclear non-proliferation
through the 1966 Treaty of Chapultepec, the United States was expanding all forms
of missiles; President Luis Echeverría’s tercermundismo against the United States was
ignored by the U.S.; and as the United States extended democratization to women
and Afro-Americans between 1924 and 1964, Mexico consolidated its perfect dicta-
torship.
Mexico’s sudden policy liberalization and its more glacial social adaptation
reconfigured values after the 1980s. Even before Mexican liberalism began, the se-
xenio crises forced policy-making to become more open and predictable. By the 1990s,
the emergence of a robust binational constituency created a critical electoral bloc in
both countries (Lawrence, 2002: 1A), and when Hispanics replaced Afro-Americans
as the largest U.S. minority by 2003, they became a long-term influential congres-
sional group.
Yet, a Mexico-U.S. security community remains elusive even amidst security
considerations. Jorge Dominguez’s and Rafael Fernández de Castro’s three twenti-
eth-century phases of Mexican security strategy help explain why (2001: ch. 2).
They found balancing until World War II, abnegation during the 1940s-1960s, and
bandwagoning from the 1990s (Jervis and Snyder, 1991), notably under Zedillo. Rival
claims over Central America and Cuba led to balancing before World War I, but was
replaced by abnegation after 1942: through the Joint Mexico-U.S. Defense Com-
mission, Mexico would not participate in any U.S. Military Assistance Advisory
Group during the entire Cold War, or join any alliances against the United States,
threaten it, build capabilities against it, rely on the U.S. for military purchases, or
cooperate appreciably over international security issues. These first three char-
acteristics, according to Dominguez and Fernández de Castro, reflected band-
wagoning.
Although David Mares sees Mexico and the U.S. as part of a fairly well-defined
pluralistic security community from the 1940s (1995: ch. 2), Stephan Haggard and
Guadalupe González González point out the fundamental weaknesses of the
argument (1998: 295-332): power asymmetry, U.S. perception of Mexican insta-
bility, Mexican unwillingness to protect U.S. property and economic rights, and
low trust owing to cross-border externalities such as drugs, immigration, and envi-
ronmental standards. In a bold attempt to update and revive the Deutschian
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model, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett pay a lot more attention to trust and
a number of other domestic considerations largely overlooked by theorists of the
1950s (1998: 29-65). Understood as both structure in terms of power and knowl-
edge, and processes of transactions, organizations, and social learning, trust, its
precipitating conditions, inducements, and relation with peaceful change improved
after the 1980s, suggesting a movement toward Mares’s mature form of a pluralistic
security community. Sustaining it after 9/11 against increasingly unpredictable
exogenous forces will not be easy. 
Except for surrendering its sovereign rights, Mexico satisfies all other criteria of
an amalgamated security community, displayed in the last 9 rows of Table 3. The Fox
administration’s election proposal to drop barriers to human migration may even be
seen as one step toward satisfying that factor, too; and the Fox administration vig-
orously seeks dual citizenship for these migrants, thus creating a significant transna-
tionalized electoral constituency, itself a new factor in regional integration. Newly
created agencies under the Mexican Foreign Ministry (the Institute for Mexicans
Abroad, initially headed by the unassuming Oaxacan social worker, Candido Mo-
rales; and the National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad) specifically
addressed the binational community. If both forms of security community fit theo-
retically, but remain empirically evasive, how does neofunctionalism fare? 
Neofunctionalism and North America
Based on works by Haas and other scholars, Joseph S. Nye identifies four prereq-
uisites, seven process mechanisms, and three perceptual frameworks of neofunc-
tionalism, listed in that order in Table 4, which examines Mexico-U.S. relations. The
prerequisites of political pluralism, economic symmetry, elite complementarity, and
adaptability, are well satisfied in Western Europe, but although they show high
Mexico-U.S. potential, economic symmetry is hardly attainable for a very, very long
time, if at all. Yet, its relative decline over time as a perceptual or policy-making con-
sideration in Mexico may be attributed to increasing per capita income, the intertwin-
ing of the two economies, and upgrading of Mexico’s economic performance. With
Mexico now among the top fifteen economies in the world, economic symmetry may
not appropriately measure its integrative potential since over 85 percent of Mexico’s
trade and two-thirds of its investment depend on the United States (IMF, 2000: 326-27,
459-61; Rugman and Gestrin, 1994; and World Bank, 2000: 231). Whether openness
facilitates interdependence over integration, or vice versa, it helps convert the former
into the latter, thus generating a security community in all but name.
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Increasing elite complementarity over the past 20-odd years is matched by
increasing Mexican pluralism, while the capacity to adapt is also being vividly de-
monstrated by each country toward the other. Just as these integrative potentials are
more satisfied than not, so too are the several process mechanisms. Those procedures
are: spillover; rising transactions; coalition formation; elite socialization; group iden-
tity; influence of external actors; and an ideological-identitive claim.
Spillover (Haas, 2004), or what David Mitrany called the doctrine of ramifica-
tions (1948: 350-60), really intensified since the 1980s even though it initiated much
earlier. Common functions, such as checking illegal immigration to the United States
through the 1965 maquiladora program, and developing/managing water rights
(Belausteguigoitia and Guadarrama, 1997: 91-124), exploded into expanding trans-
actions, boosting disagreements, developing NAFTA’s conflict resolution procedures
and adjusting national trade relief laws to them; transporting merchandise also
necessitated standardizing vehicular emission and safety standards, and depicting
spillovers through NAFTA’s labor and environmental side agreements.
More spillover meant more transactions, not just of merchandise, but also of
services and human flows, as well as governmental supervision and transactional
intervention. NAFTA introduced more regular exchanges of trade, environment, and
labor secretaries of the two countries, while labor unions and both moderate and critical
environmental groups on both sides of the border also began regular exchanges
and formalized meetings (Hogenboom, 1996). Country leaders and societal elites
were mobilized to establish regular cross-border contacts. For example, the dispute
settlement arrangements for trade, investment, labor, and environment led to moni-
toring unfair practices of trading any commodity from orange juice to steel (Thurston,
1993: 1A), relocating waste disposal facilities amidst the opposition of municipal
laws (Borja Tamayo, 2001: 62-90), facilitating butterfly migration from Canada to
Michoacán, Mexico by landscape alterations (Yoon, 2002: 5), and granting extra
worker privileges by a benevolent government (Otero, 1995).
As officials and the lay public spoke more in terms of the language of liberaliza-
tion, market competitiveness, and escalator of economic progress, rather than nation-
alization, government patronage, or security-riddled considerations until 9/11,
ideological identities also broadened and deepened. Engagement abroad reflected
the shift from nationalism or introversion toward greater joint action abroad.
Neofunctionalist perceptual frameworks necessarily changed. The bottom
three rows of Table 4 captures changes in terms of how (a) benefit distribution is
equitable; (b) external problem perception is coherent; and (c) integration is made
cost free.
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The picture for Mexico and the U.S. may be mixed today, but clearly more pos-
itively inclined than before the 1980s. Unlike the zero-sum orientation of both coun-
tries toward each other before the 1980s, the positive non-zero sum approach
thereafter raises the post-9/11 question if formalized and broader security arrange-
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Table 4
PREREQUISITIES, PROCESSES, AND PERCEPTIONS:
MEXICO-U.S. RELATIONAL SHIFTS THROUGH NEOFUNCTIONALIST EYES
Dimensions
Economic symmetry 
among units
Elite complementarity 
Pluralism
Capacity to adapt
Spillover
Growing transactions
Intergovernmentalist
growth
Transnationalist growth
Elite socialization
Growth in ideological
identity
Increasing interaction
with external actors
Benefit distribution higher 
and more equitable
Converging perceptions
of external problems
Integration as cost-free
Pre-1980s 
No, and very little attempt to
reduce the gap
Very limited
No: perfect dictatorship;
flimsy democratic pursuits
Limited and not needed:
rigidified societies owing to 
Cold War and Mexican ISI
Prevalent, but within limits
Prevalent, within limits
Prevalent, within limits
Prevalent, within limits
Prevalent, nationalistic
Deliberately very limited
Circumscribed
Concentrated benefits
due to ISI and  Cold War 
Limited and mixed
Not really: nationalism for
Mexico, multilateralism
for U.S.
Post-1980s
No, but upgrading relation-
ship softens gaps
Yes, and increasingly so
Yes, and becoming
irreversible
Yes, and increasingly so
NAFTA expands this
Explosive in variety/volume
Exponential 
Multiplication
Significant growth
Increasing parallels and
convergences
Limited outside North
America
Higher benefits, more
equitable distribution, but
asymmetry remains
Improving, though gaps
remain
Increasingly so, but
subject to externalities
Adapted from Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., 1990: 431-459.
ments or existing socioeconomic differences will deepen integration more (Andreas,
1988: 201-20). 
Summarizing Economic Integration
Western Europe proceeded more smoothly with economic than political integra-
tion. Whereas NAFTA remains locked in Bela Balassa’s first stage of regional eco-
nomic integration, of adopting free trade arrangements, Western Europe completed
this by 1967, when building a customs union based on a common external tariff was
well underway. Harmonizing fiscal and monetary policies during the 1970s slowly
unfolded a common market, the third stage. With the development of a common
currency, the European Community entered the fourth stage, and appropriately
changed its name to the European Union at Maastricht in 1992. Only the fifth and
final stage of full economic integration remains, but political integration is already
underway.
As a 15-year deal, NAFTA’s future depends on leadership and degrees of conver-
gences. In spite of satisfying many, if not all, of the neofunctionalist and security
community characteristics, NAFTA still smacks of unfulfillment. Table 5 highlights im-
ponderables in the Mexico-U.S. dyad.
The first involves the degree to which resolving joint problems involve public
debate. Before the 1980s both countries were too far apart and headed in quite dif-
ferent directions to seriously pursue this opportunity, but this changed considerably
after the 1980s, without implying every common problem would or would not be
tackled jointly. Sovereign preferences still prevail over oil for Mexico, national secu-
rity for the U.S., and drugs and immigration for both. The second dimension simi-
larly shows nationalistic considerations prevailing before the 1980s, but NAFTA has
been enhancing mutual benefits ever since. Asking if alternatives to integration are
less satisfactory, the third dimension dittoes this same observation: technological
and cultural convergences matched by equally formidable divergences. Finally, the
fourth dimension inquiry if the two countries have similar policy responses toward
non-members, also reiterates the pre-1980s vacuum and the fragile period thereafter.
What are the prospects of preference patterns being re-engineered by elections
in North America? The honest answer is both yes and no, but the devil lies in the
details.
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Table 5
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS IN MEXICO-U.S. RELATIONAL SHIFTS
Adapted from Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., 1990: 431-459.
Dimensions
Degree of politicizing
common problems in order
to resolve them
Redistributing political and
economic resources for com-
mon benefits
Alternatives to integration 
less satisfactory
Degree of policy convergence
toward non-members
Separating economic and
social tasks from political 
Supranationalizing
political tasks 
Limits of spillover 
Degree of political
will to enhance economic
integration
Pre-1980s 
Too far apart for this to have
happened automatically or
deeply
Not seriously pursued, and
when actually pursued,
emphasis too nationalistic
On the contrary, they were
satisfactory: ISI for Mexico,
multilateralism for U.S.
Not an issue: both had inde-
pendent and antagonist for-
eign policy imperatives based
on national interests
Difficult proposition given
nationalism and militarism
No significant efforts made
High: nationalism, militarism
Economic integration not an
issue, but political will to pro-
mote nationalism high
Post-1980s
Considerable progress made;
lays foundation to diversify
issue-areas, but sticky issue-areas
remain untouched
Attempts being made, but
gaps in some areas too large
for quick resolution
Increasingly so: both markets
too intertwined to remain
independent; yet deepening
integration may be inevitable,
but only at incremental
speed: neither is prepared for
accelerated integration, even
less after 9/11
Not fully tested: Mexican
bandwagoning with U.S. policy
responses to non-members
to large extent; too few exter-
nal Mexican links for U.S. to
be concerned with; customs
union still a pipe dream
Difficult still, but slightly
improved picture
Half-hearted beginnings
made, but U.S. retains veto
Decreasing but not eliminat-
ed, some factors permanently
present (security)
Political will still remains
decisive, but economic
externalities growing
ELECTORAL PATTERNS AND POLITICAL
RECONFIGURATIONS: BUSINESS AS USUAL?
Twenty-one years after the Treaty of Rome went into effect, a European Parliament
emerged. Although not subordinating state legislatures, supranational preferences
reflect growth, adjustments to state counterparts, and occasionally overriding
them, for instance, through the growth and stability pact. What are the prospects of
similar convergences across North America? Given the asymmetry highlighted in
economic integration, this study isolates the election of a U.S. chief executive to
measure North Americanization, leaving other dimensions for other studies to exam-
ine. If it is high, broadly defined, we would expect collectively formulated policies
to increase. Neofunctionalists would find the common economic policies and insti-
tutions pushing toward –even demanding– political convergences over issues and
institutions. If it is low, every election would retain an introverted focus, prevent-
ing issue convergences across boundaries from making a dent. Yet, asymmetry also
prevails here: U.S. presidential elections have a greater impact on Canada and
Mexico than Canadian or Mexican elections for the chief executive have on the
United States.
Connecting free trade with elections, I argue, provided the turning point of North
American political integration (Druckman, 1986). More to the point, the coinciden-
tal 1988 elections in all three countries may be to North America what the May 9,
1950 Schuman Declaration of Interdependence was to the European Union. Free
trade suddenly became an issue in the 1988 Canadian elections, even though Brian
Mulroney’s 1984 election victory by the then largest margin in Canadian history
predicted the replacement of Pierre Trudeau’s nationalistic economic policies;
Mexico’s 1988 elections addressed the dominant issue of the time, of liberalizing a
stagnant and protected economy, and thereby implying improved economic rela-
tions with the United States; and although only the United States did not have free
trade or liberalization at the top of its 1988 electoral agenda, as the first post-Cold
War elections, it ventilated several issues suppressed by Cold War imperatives,
such as the environment, a peace dividend, immigration, and so forth, almost all
imposing free trade restraints. 
Canadian and Mexican elections found both countries positioned between
domestic concerns and regional possibilities, but the U.S. elections coincided with
the emergence of George H.W. Bush’s Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI),
a bland proposal expressing infinite hopes. More concretely, the 1988 Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) did not raise any public U.S. eyebrows since this
was a deal between two countries already sharing the largest open-border trans-
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actions anywhere in the world, whereas in Canada, memories of how Sir Wilfrid
Laurier lost the 1912 elections for agreeing to a free trade agreement with the U.S.
were uppermost. Mulroney barely scraped through in 1988, losing 7 percent of
the popular vote and 41 parliamentary seats from four years earlier. 
Only after Mexico’s Carlos Salinas de Gortari also proposed a free trade agree-
ment with the U.S. in February 1990 (Mayer, 1998: 39-40), and negotiations got
underway for NAFTA from September, did free trade hit the U.S. elections. Ross
Perot founded the Reform Party to explicitly oppose NAFTA, contested the 1992 elec-
tions, and although he lost, as did George H.W. Bush, Perot’s reactions produced
the environmental and labor side agreements.
Bush lost the elections not so much because of his advocacy of regional free trade
as due to an economy in the doldrums, yet Bill Clinton won the elections not so much
by how saggy the economy as for the safeguards he proposed against a possible
NAFTA. These side-bar agreements helped NAFTA be ratified, albeit by a narrow margin,
and paved the way for the first regionalized institutions to be established under the
integrative pursuits: the Commission on Economic Cooperation and the Commission
on Labor Cooperation, each with their own intergovernmental councils, society-based
joint public affairs committees, and modestly supranationalized dispute-settlement
bodies (Hogenboom, 1996; and Otero, 1995: 637-62). For the same reasons as Gilbert
R. Winham offered to explain the 1988 CUFTA negotiations, the dispute settlement
mechanism became a NAFTA linchpin (1988: 35-36): a bothersome issue for the U.S., but
procedurally significant for others. Not just for contentious environmental and labor
issues, but also over anti-dumping and countervailing duties as well as investment
conflicts, NAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanisms (a) began the process of converting
North American issue orientation into meaningful institutions; (b) survived better
than NAFTA itself through the first ten years of the agreement; and (c) inspired the sim-
plification of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) dispute settlement procedures
(Winham and Grant, 1991). Without Canadian and U.S. electoral pressures, these out-
comes may not have been possible. Even with those pressures, the United States con-
tinues courting the world for more FTAs today. With these arrangements still intact in
2005, North American institutions may be in their embryonic stage.
The Clinton administration’s North American approach also benefited from
externalities. First, the longest U.S. economic growth phase in the entire twentieth
century came during his tenure, making trade a less prickly issue, especially at elec-
tion time (and actually making Perot’s political challenge meaningless). Second,
when free trade controversies forced Mulroney’s resignation, after serving him a
warning in the 1988 elections, Jean Chrétien’s defeat of Kim Campbell, Canada’s
first woman prime minister and Mulroney’s successor, by the largest margin in its
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electoral history, produced a compatible personal relationship with Clinton based
on ideological identity and pragmatism, while successfully riding out secessionist
pressures in Quebec, perhaps the last in a long time. Both leaders provided policy
continuity and welfare enhancement, suggesting ideology, pragmatism, leader-
ship, and party identity as potential sources of future convergences or integration
(Coxe, 2004: 37). Finally, by plucking Mexico out of the 1995 peso crisis, Clinton
put the country on the road to reaping full NAFTA harvests, as trade deficits with
the U.S. turned into hefty surpluses, easing the democratic transition Zedillo had
in mind. In fact, even though Zedillo’s PRI was replaced by a different party after
seven decades in 2000, from a North American perspective, the NAFTA commitment
remained unchanged. In fact, it got stronger under Vicente Fox Quesada’s PAN,
indicating the brief decline of ideological influences along this front. Thus, during
the 1990s, all three North American countries simultaneously experienced consid-
erable North Americanization, pragmatism over ideological pushes, more benefits
from externalities than costs of political or economic market failures, growth in
common values, and increasing integrative irreversibilities.
George W. Bush’s first term began on a grand note with Mexico, the first coun-
try he visited after taking office. This broke the tradition of visiting Canada before
any other country, elevating Fox and Mexico into a rare, special U.S. friend, then
receiving Fox’s immigration proposal. Fox’s target audience was also North Amer-
icanized, the binationals, that is, Mexicans with U.S. residency, a booming population
of potentially enormous electoral significance in both Mexico and the United States.
Bush’s generally supportive stance suggested the two countries, and with them
North America as a region, were willing to go beyond trade, investment, environ-
ment, and labor on the collective agenda to the sticky political issue of immigration.
Other secular developments, however, intervened to prevent what would have been
Fox’s coup.
Chrétien’s ideological differences with Bush diluted the North Americanization
processes underway. Similarly, the U.S. Congress was not as receptive to Fox’s plans
as Bush seemed to have been. Above all, 9/11 shifted U.S. attention and resources
almost exclusively to security matters from the brief honeymoon with issues of  low
politics. U.S. trade interests returned to the multilateral level, just as they had at the
outset of the Cold War in 1947 (Hussain, 1993: ch. 4), but this time with the determi-
nation to not lose control of developments as it had in the past (Feinberg, 2003).
Bush’s competitive liberalization trade strategy reflected this background. Placed in
the hands of U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick, a series of free trade nego-
tiations began in Central America; Canada faded from Bush’s trading radar until Paul
Martin’s determination as premier to restore Canada’s privileged place in Washington
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post-9/11 (Kitchen, 2004: 693-710); and negative externalities accentuated political
and economic market failures through growing North American distrust, dishar-
mony, and dearth of necessary information. The 2004 U.S. elections couldn’t have
been better timed to worsen this atmosphere. As I show, in contributing to the dete-
riorating North American climate, the elections also pushed all three countries to
the brink where costly bilateral relations may push them into either breakdown or
compromises.
The 2004 U.S. 
Presidential Elections
All three countries were delicately poised between state and supranational interests
on the eve of George W.’s 2004 re-election. Martin thawed U.S. relations but still
refused to participate in the U.S. missile defense program. Fox had neither the immi-
gration deal he so cherished, nor the legislative votes to pass his domestic policy
measures. Fox’s eclipse from Bush’s priority list elevated Martin’s fortunes. Ulti-
mately, the U.S. needs both neighbors to make homeland security work. This is more
likely than Canadian-Mexican relations deepening to chip away at U.S. North Amer-
ican asymmetry.
Even though electoral dynamics may help, it seems U.S. elections may impact
Canada and Mexico more than Canadian or Mexican elections the United States. To
begin with, Canada’s 2004 elections indicated (a) ideological parallels between the
Conservatives and U.S. Republicans; (b) Canada’s multiculturalism, by raising a
post-9/11 U.S. red flag, demanded a more pragmatic than ideological handling of
relations with the U.S., which Martin understood better than his fellow Liberal
predecessor, Chrétien; and (c) domestic issues, such as fiscal balance, health re-
forms, and the growing East-West divide, also necessitated more policy-making
attention than trade. 
Mexico’s 2006 presidential elections will be evaluated against the background
of (a) NAFTA liberalization extending to very sensitive sectors, such as agriculture
and petrochemicals, requiring more regional dialogue and better salesmanship of the
collective agenda to an increasingly divided and suspicious population; (b) unpre-
dictability about the future of NAFTA and Mexico’s own transitional domestic politics;
and (c) maquiladoras migrating to China. Critical changes continue to be U.S.-related
in one way or another.
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Spillover Issues
Serving both as a vehicle of political integration and carrying disruptive forces, at least
three electoral issues may set the parameters of future North Americanization: (a) immi-
gration; (b) evangelism; and (c) security. Collectively managing them would produce
positive integration, but individualized treatment of ignorance would irreversibly
negate political integration. All three impact Mexico and the U.S. more than any other
North American dyad, but a Canadian conciliatory role could prove critical.
Immigration
Perhaps the thorniest issue in Mexico-U.S. relations, immigration provides real and
imaginary problems of electoral value. As Javier Aguilar García shows, the average
annual Mexican emigrant figure rose from 29 000 in the 1960s to 390 000 today (2005:
56). In addition to the 13-fold increase, the emigrants no longer go to only perform jobs
U.S. citizens won’t do: many are spouses, or sponsored relatives, moving from low-
income backgrounds into higher-income societies. According to Erika González and
Esther González (González and González, 2002: 61), the roughly 24 million Mexicans
legally residing in the United States, not to mention the 8 million undocumented migrants
(María Valdez, 2001: 72), constitute U.S. 452 billion dollars in purchasing power, an
amount “almost comparable to the size of the entire Mexican economy”. Not only has
a huge Hispanic market become part and parcel of the U.S. economy, but it also carries the
potential for self-perpetuating growth (by virtue of a higher birth rate), even if further
Mexican emigration is halted. That, of course, will not happen, given the incessant U.S.
guest-worker program requirements, especially in agriculture, each year.
Political consequences go at least as deep. By expanding the population of bor-
der states in the southern and western corners of the United States, Hispanics exert
electoral influences: the 2000 census shifted over a score of congressional seats from
the northeast to these geographical areas of the United States, creating the potential
of Hispanic congressional leaders one day formulating public policies. Thus North
Americanization is occurring without the support of formalized integrative proce-
dures or mechanisms, and in the process is breeding undesirable externalities (ille-
gal immigration), political market failures (unnecessary electoral polemics), and
sub-optimal policy outcomes (pre-election promises to Hispanics, post-election re-
versals). Coordinated bilateral policies also offer a honorable exit from the problems
doomsday-sayers, such as Samuel P. Huntington and CNN’s Lou Dobbs, perpetually
spotlight. 
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Evangelism
With religion, election outcomes have more vigorous foreign policy consequences,
such as, for example, Reagan’s invocation of an “evil empire.” More precisely, it ele-
vated a foreign policy-making cabal to untouchable levels (Mann, 2004). Whether
two subsequent wars on Iraq were a product of this untouchability rather than ral-
lying to the defense of tiny Kuwait or against weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
will be debated for a long time to come, but less contentious is the ability of those
making military policy to precisely identify the sources of the post-Cold War threat
to the United States: actual or perceived weapons of mass destruction, whether
nuclear, biological, chemical, or any other agent. They even inter-related WMDs and
democratization: world opinion was directed at whichever state had WMDs them for
not being democratic enough. Eliminating WMDs need not necessarily produce
long-term democratization, but why a single member of an “evil empire” became 3
“axes of evil”, and now, after the 2004 election and Condeleezza Rice’s Senate con-
firmation hearings, 6 “outposts of tyranny”, can be better understood when authori-
tarianism is interpreted through democratic lenses (Harris, 2005: A01 and VandeHei,
2005: A02): as outposts of tyranny–(another biblical term) Iran, North Korea, Belarus,
Cuba, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe face U.S. military intervention, exile-driven demo-
cratization, market liberalization, and evangelism.
The conspicuous drift towards the Republican Party of all major groups in the
2004 election, and particularly the lopsided evangelical identification, are not just
snap-shot developments, but part of a long-term trend beginning in the 1970s when
the Roe v. Wade decision provided the spark to the subsequent evangelical fire. 
Two long-term trends favoring the Republicans might catalyze party realign-
ment: the born-again and Catholic votes. An apparent cycle representing born-
again voting turn-outs suggests George W. Bush is reviving the high levels of support
Reagan once commanded, strengthening the argument he is more a Reagan II than
a Bush II. With relatively lower support for Republicans in 1980 (64 percent), born-
again voters turned out in droves for Republican Reagan in 1984 (80 percent), while
Reagan’s coat-tails helped George H.W. get a peak born-again vote tally (81 per-
cent). By 1992, the Reagan legacy had faded since George H.W. proved to be more
the east-coast neo-conservative than the heartland New Right; a bad economy
worsened by the war in Iraq sent a message still worth remembering today; and
secular forces were beginning to gather momentum as the Internet revolution was
in a global take-off stage, as was the largest growth period of the U.S. economy.
Bush got only 55 percent of the 1992 born-again vote. Lower turn-out led to a paltry
52 percent support for Bob Dole in 1996. With Karl Rove’s machinations, George W.
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won back the born-again voters in 2000 (69 percent), and brought many more of
them out in 2004 to return to the salient levels of the 1980s, with 78 percent.
Evangelism demands attention. First, it shows that when born-again voters
turn up, Republicans enjoy unassailable leverage at the polls. Second, there is no
counterpart mainstream cycle, suggesting broader layers of Protestant voters pre-
fer Republicans to Democrats by and large, but are flexible enough to change par-
ties should a different candidate present more appealing credentials, as Clinton did
in 1996 and Carter  20 years earlier. Third, the cycle clearly indicates no trend is irre-
versible unless it is institutionalized: even the evangelical drive can be overcome,
as I discuss below. Finally, the born-again cycle can possibly be broken, not neces-
sarily by declining voters, but by institutionalizing born-again norms, such as
against abortion, or gay marriages, or influencing the selection of Supreme Court
judges, or simply permitting the church to pervade the day-to-day lives of normal
citizens. Concrete institutionalization could sustain higher born-again voter turn-
outs every time there is an election, since they appear more determined and ener-
gized than, for example, many liberal groups. However, as Barry C. Burden argues
(2004), Bush’s 2004 victory depended less on “moral values” than on a combination
of white voters, married women, and a higher turn-out, reflecting concerns over
“domestic security” rather than evangelical positions, suggesting secular forces are
unlikely to roll over and play dead. 
In terms of the second long-term trend, the Catholic votes show the Democrats
to be not only uncompetitive in attracting these traditional supporters, but also,
given the huge Catholic concentrations in the traditionally Democratic U.S. Northeast,
the Republicans look set to challenge Democrats on their home turf.
Streamlining this second observation is the almost wholesale southern shift
toward Republicans. It is ironic that Abraham Lincoln’s Republican Party, which
launched the Civil War, is finally winning the hearts and minds of the southern
whites it defeated in the 1860s. In addition to the country itself becoming more con-
servative, both the born-again appeal and population growth rate across the South
generate realignment forces also dividing the country the same way race did for a
century after Lincoln. With mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Jews distributed
across the North and the evangelical Protestants growing in appeal and num-
bers across the South and West, southern segregationist tendencies and sentiments
are also likely to revive U.S. WASPs, much to Huntington’s relief.
Implications for Mexico are obvious: first, the southern shift of U.S. politics,
even if based on evangelism, makes Mexican emigrants a more robust political
player. In the final analysis, Hispanics may either challenge evangelical forces in the
United States or join them as they began doing in the 2004 election (Ríos, 2005:
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93-96). Second, a simultaneous evangelical spread into Mexico’s South to convert
indigenous people brings the challenge home to Mexico. It is expected to raise con-
cerns, and challenge the Catholic church, and sow seeds of instability in the coun-
tryside. Protestant spread has paralleled the dissemination of market and material
values, as well as the spiked alcohol consumption among landless peasants, farm-
ers, and rural dwellers, precisely what the Catholic church is struggling to prevent
in Mexico’s marginalized southern provinces. Third, what Mexico faces in its south-
ern provinces also extends across Central America, creating a vast area of evangel-
ism threatening the Catholic order. The more pronounced these incompatibilities
become, the more likely the integrative effects of U.S. elections will be matched by
disruptive developments simultaneously. 
Security
To be sure, 9/11 was not the reason why the Mexico-U.S. honeymoon under Fox
and Bush ebbed, nor was this breakdown security-related. The week before, Fox’s
migration deal was grounded, not by Bush but by congressmen with sticky feet.
This, in turn, delayed Fox’s responses to the traumatic 9/11 events, which was not
interpreted very amicably in Washington. A series of minor actions and interpre-
tations conspired to worsen Mexico-U.S. relations more than was due. This routine
elevation of post-9/11 security considerations over economic ones was widely
interpreted in both Mexico and the United States as reflecting true U.S. colors: in
Mexico, it reaffirmed hegemony, with Mexico a hapless victim; and in the U.S., it
heightened the need to tighten porous borders which several social segments,
such as latter-day sponsors of the Minutemen project, redirected against Mexican
emigrants. One externality (9/11) meshed with another (illegal immigration) to
produce both economic and political market failures (raising costs of trans-border
transactions and placing legal immigrants unfairly under the proverbial gun, res-
pectively). The result: bilateral sub-optimalities. A formalized security communi-
ty could minimize mutual damages, thus promoting political integration.
Border problems imperil broader foreign policy principles. One such principle
for Mexico –and a holy one given its geographical proximity to a superpower– is
non-intervention. Historically speaking, the original non-entangling-alliances poli-
cy approach George Washington proposed in his 1793 Farewell Address is not far
different from Mexico’s equally historic non-intervention. Whereas the United States
could conspicuously shift after one century from this orientation toward all sorts of
foreign policy entanglements, Mexico is pressured to unwittingly do likewise after
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one century of constitutionally-sanctioned non-interventionism. It was difficult for
Mexico to do so with respect to U.N. Resolution 1441 in the Security Council during
the heated 2003-2004 prelude to the second Iraqi war (Hussain, 2004: 213-30).
Nevertheless, by becoming Latin America’s Security Council rotating representa-
tive, Mexico’s capacity to pursue non-intervention is questionable: not doing so
would strengthen its North American credentials. Mexico’s predicament and U.S.
distaste for Mexico’s opposition in the Security Council could have been prevented
if North American political integration were more formalized: principles and poli-
cy preferences of the three countries could be coordinated bilaterally or trilaterally
for more long-lasting results than if done unilaterally, internationally, or multilater-
ally. Just as misperceptions and misunderstandings in the Canada-U.S. dyad were
averted with the formation and maintenance of NATO, they may also not have devel-
oped in terms of the Iraq war if Mexico-U.S. coordination had preceded UN Security
Council Resolution 1441 deliberations.
Furthermore, benefits would also spread against drug trafficking and money
laundering. 
Summary
A broad riffle through three persistent Mexico-U.S. problems exposes three ineffi-
cient bilateral relations. As in the popular prisoner’s dilemma game, each side finds
defection idiosyncratically preferable to cooperation, due in part to a dearth of full
information. Shifting to the more collaborative stag hunt game, in which mutual
cooperation stems not so much from affection as from necessity, it becomes difficult
with a prisoner’s dilemma mentality, but proposes greater North American rewards.
Just as NAFTA has shown how pragmatism can reap better relational harvests than
nationalism or wishful thinking, North American political pitfalls and perceived
problems can also be tackled by working to convert potentials into practice.
Economic and political integration between Canada and Mexico might prove
the most effective cure for North American asymmetry: not only would expanded
interaction between Canada and Mexico partly offset U.S.-based imbalances, but
political convergences between the two would actually provide each other an alter-
native to unwilling but unavoidable U.S. dependence. What is at stake is large, but
neither side is biting as yet. If they don’t, or the longer they take in doing so, the
more political integration will be delayed and the higher the costs each side may
have to one day pay.
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CONCLUSIONS
Central to resolving market failures and softening the shocks of externalities is
political leadership. Whether electing a chief executive creates regional spillovers
or not, a study of the 2004 U.S. presidential election suggests six forces promoting
or preventing North American political integration: (a) the purposeful orientation
shift of politicians from ideological and idiosyncratic interpretations toward the
pragmatic and international, evident in the policy shift from domestic to foreign
interests; (b) institutionalizing the orientation shift, evident in the self-perpetuating
growth of bureaucracies and technocrats not held accountable to specific political
leaders; (c) apprehensions from divisive integrative messages, such as evangelism,
drug trafficking, or money laundering curbing aspirations from such unifying
flows as trade and investment from reaching their full potentials, evident in the
unnecessary costs imposed by the former upon the latter; (d) safeguarding against
external shocks, such as 9/11, by resorting to past collaboratively established net-
works, rather than retreating from them, evident in joint meetings held and com-
mon institutions invoked; (e) exploring new avenues of collaboration, thus opening
new competencies and thereby enhancing the indispensability of collective action;
and (f) compatible leaders across boundaries.
How have these catalysts impacted the three North American countries? What
leadership profile do they ultimately predict? Table 6 profiles the summary below.
In terms of the purposeful orientation shift of potential North American lead-
ers, one might find valid and valuable examples in all three countries: Mulroney
and Chrétien in Canada; Salinas, Zedillo, and Fox in Mexico; and Bush, Sr., Clinton,
and Bush, Jr., in the U.S.. Each country finds them in both rival political parties,
suggesting the ideological differences can be subordinated to pragmatism, and
external issues can be brought to bear upon local concerns. Reversibility, however,
proves critical. Can the orientation return significantly to ideological and local
issues as to subordinate pragmatism and external orientation? Since the 1980s, I
argue, this has only happened in the United States, that, too, triggered largely by
9/11. Chief executives in Canada and Mexico, no matter which party they have
thus far represented, probably see more win-win outcomes in associating with the
United States than their U.S. counterparts may see in deepening Canadian or
Mexican relations: the U.S. aggressively seeks more economic relations outside of
North America than Canada or Mexico do. Furthermore, U.S. twists and turns can-
not all be attributed to 9/11. Evangelism, immigration, and homeland security, as
discussed previously, also played their parts in keeping localism and ideological
preferences alive.
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Have leaders in the three countries sought to institutionalize their orientation
shifts? As the second row indicates, in all three countries, chief executives have
taken at least the initial steps in this regard, though only in the United States is a
reversal appreciated. Through NAFTA and its side agreements, all three countries
have thus far either abided by the rulings of dispute settlement mechanisms, or if
not, they have sought solutions through commonly established rules rather than
resorting to non-compliance. Whether it is NAFTA’s Chapter 11 on investment dis-
putes or Chapter 19 on anti-dumping and countervailing duties, not to mention the
environmental or labor disputes under the respective side agreements, binational
panels or trilateral tribunals/commission have helped reduce frictions consider-
ably from the pre-CUFTA or pre-NAFTA eras. These encouraging signs are probably
not irreversible, though the bone of contention is more likely to arise in the United
Table 6
NORTH AMERICAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION: CATALYSTS
Adapted from Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., 1990: 431-459.
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Catalysts
Occurrence of
purposeful
orientation shift?
Institutionalization 
of orientation shift?
Gresham’s law in
integrative instincts 
(bad instincts driving 
out good ones)?
Safeguarding 
against external 
shocks?
Exploring new 
avenues of
collaboration?
Compatible
leadership?
Canada
Yes: it is bipartisan, 
and no reversion 
seen as yet
Has been initiated; 
no reversal fears as 
yet; leadership has 
been critical
Probability is lower: 
disagreements have
been rules-respecting
Less need:
impossible to do so
against U.S.
Consistently missed
opportunity
Present;
necessity-driven
Mexico
Yes: it is bipartisan, 
and no reversion 
seen as yet
Has been initiated; 
no reversal fears as 
yet; leadership has 
been critical
Probability is higher: 
disagreements can be
and have been 
rules-defying
Less need: impossible
to do so against U.S.
Consistently missed
opportunity
Present; necessity-
driven, but with 
a wild-card possibility
United States
Yes: it is bipartisan, 
but is reversible
(for at least 
exogenous reasons)
Has been initiated, 
but remains 
reversible; leadership 
is critical
Probability is higher: 
disagreements can 
be and have been 
rules-defying
Greater need: Would
produce Pareto sub-
optimal results
Consistently missed
opportunity
Present; but potential
not fully utilized,
carries wild-card
possibility
States than in Canada and Mexico since the U.S. Congress exerts more independent
impact on trade issues than the Canadian parliament or Mexican legislative cham-
bers. In the final analysis, leadership orientations matter: whether chief executives
can sway legislators may prove crucial to any attempt at institutionalizing orienta-
tions, indeed to overcoming local, idiosyncratic, and ideological preferences.
Turning to the bad-versus-good messages dichotomy in the third row, owing
to the nature of the issues, both Mexico and the U.S. are more ambiguously placed
than Canada: both Mexico and the U.S. lock horns over some of these issues, such
as drug trafficking or immigration; and although Canada and the U.S. also spar
over lumber, port, wheat, salmon, and beer, they have historically sought to outwit
each other using bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral rules rather than resorting to the
passions that drug trafficking and immigration stir. Canada’s historically longer
yearning to involve rules in relations with its more powerful southern neighbor
does not always make it the righteous party, as it also resorts to widespread unfair
trading practices itself, such as subsidizing truckers or hiding behind provincial
laws, but it has been guided more by rules than defiance when compared to
Mexico.
Both Canada and Mexico have been more interested in safeguarding against
external shocks than the U.S., primarily because both serve less than the U.S. as
vehicles of international controversy. Supporting these arguments is the lopsided
dependence of both countries on the United States for trade and investment; and
although Canada engages in UN peacekeeping and caters to immigrants from the
rest of the world, Mexico, even with its more insulated position, occasionally sides
with less developed countries, or Latin America. Of course, as a superpower, the
U.S. reserves issues of high politics as vital interests; and unless these are threat-
ened, for example by 9/11, low-politics issues, like trade relations, become a
favorite engagement. Nevertheless, even over these low-politics issues, the U.S. is
more diversified in transactions and objectives than either Canada or Mexico.
Ultimately, as with the bad-versus-good message dichotomy, safeguarding against
external shocks reveals negative externalities and market failures which North
American collaboration can offset, creating demands for political integration rather
than supplying it aimlessly.
The fifth row of exploring new collaborative avenues illustrates a case where it
takes all three to do the proverbial tango, rather than only two. NAFTA boldly tack-
les extant trading and investment relations, leaving the more sensitive issue of
human flows out of the calculation. Just when NAFTA was blossoming came 9/11,
thus constraining policy-makers and negotiators from branching out into discussing
marginal or completely new issues. Without a springboard –most likely a leadership
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input– NAFTA might remain stuck at this stage of Balassa’s regional integration.
Although a much more congenial stage than any existing before the 1980s, unless
its full potentials are materialized, North America may suffer from missed oppor-
tunities, itself a reason to make leadership orientations more parochial, ideological,
and lackluster.
Finally, the sixth row assesses compatibility among North American chief exec-
utives. Clearly the first decade of NAFTA provided more reasons to be optimistic
than not in this regard, and especially as the compatibility crossed partisanship and
ideological preferences. Even though 9/11 came as a rude shock, Canadian and
Mexican leaders continue to seek the more compatible side of George W. Bush
today after 9/11; and if Bush can show that, even if mildly as he did at the March
2005 Waco Summit, the next five years of NAFTA may generate enough compatibili-
ty to fuel a forward momentum into the next stage of regional integration. Eco-
nomic advances in collaborative efforts can only lubricate political integration.
Thus, the United States remains the wild card: Its leaders can promote, stall, or pun-
ish North American integrative efforts; and the best Canadian and Mexican leaders
can do –as they thus far have indeed done– is to keep up their Panglossian push,
hoping their own efforts will result in the best possible of North American circum-
stances. Another Canadian election is unlikely to rock the boat, although Mexico’s
2006 elections could also produce a wild card: Success for either the PAN or the PRI
will most likely translate into maintaining the status quo of their pro-NAFTA prefer-
ences, albeit with minor modifications here and there; any PRD success will dra-
matically show if it has turned pragmatic, as its chief current star, Andrés Manuel
López Obrador, seems to be doing in his capacity as Mexico City’s Mayor, or inflate
its ideologically-built opposition and resistance. All in all, the period from those
elections in 2006 to the 2008 U.S. presidential elections could prove crucial to deter-
mining the future of North American political integration, in true Shakespearean
to-be-or-not-to-be style.
IMPLICATIONS
Two overlapping implications follow. Theoretically, with the exception of one gap,
neofunctionalism and security community theses remain relevant in their funda-
mentals to any explanation of North America, and possibly elsewhere. That gap is
North American’s stark asymmetry: Both paradigms are structured to explain
symmetrical cases paying less attention to the external domain than to the internal,
still doing remarkably well in explaining North America; if modified, however, to
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account for uneven playing fields, as seem more likely than not in the internation-
al system, their explanatory mileage would be immeasurably enhanced. 
An empirical study of North American political integration captures the his-
torical U.S. transition from being an international relations exception to becoming
part of the crowd (Lipset, 1996; Mead, 2001). Exceptionalism often recurs: divesting
Europe from a place in power rivalry and practically eliminating European multi-
polar balance of power systems; and pursuing regional economic integration with-
in the rubric of multilateralism rather than against it, utilizing one of the most
skewed playing fields on record, thus seriously questioning theoretical tenets. Yet,
exceptionalism is also being challenged by regional economic integration, but par-
ticularly with regional political integration; it is found unusually on the defensive,
supporting the status quo, and promoting the realist cause which it historically
challenged, first through isolation, then through Woodrow Wilson internationalism
and appeal to moralism. 
Its co-protagonists, Canada and Mexico, also reverse gears into exploring the
unknown rather than remaining with the familiar. After half a century of realist
experiences, though different in tone to the 500 years of European experiences, the
United States may be less the extraordinary state than the ordinary one, with all
that that entails: it led the way in shaping international institutions, unsuccessfully
in the 1920s, but with greater success 20 years later; it alone established multilat-
eralism in the 1940s, only to find equally forceful advocates elsewhere in the 1990s; it
originally ignored regional economic blocs while selectively creating political and
military associations instead, only to find trading bloc imperatives outlasting the
rationale and scope of their military counterparts in the 1990s; and it indiscriminate-
ly practiced an unusual brand of unilateralism after World War II, only to find itself
clipping those unilateral wings increasingly after winning the Cold War. 
Though not irreversible, these transformations raise a central issue. Today’s
only superpower is beginning to resemble previous great powers just when those
other great powers, both historically and potentially, seek economic integration
over military competitiveness given economic, technological, sociological, and
U.S.-based developments. As the U.S. adorns old clothes from several prior emper-
ors, Canada and Mexico have no choice but to go with the flow, suggesting more
regional integration. Yet, by losing its exceptionalism, the U.S. is as unlikely as any
previous great power to accept symmetry. The results: interdependence over inte-
gration, economic over political integration, asymmetry instead of symmetry, sub-
optimal over optimal coexistence, and external over internal triggers. Elections
cannot ignore these, but political integration can be denied by them.
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